Abstract
This article focuses on the UK’s pre-COVID 19 pandemic preparedness and its early response to the COVID-19 pandemic (January ‘20 – March ‘20). The aim of this article is to explain the high excess mortality the UK experienced compared to many of its international and European peers in the first wave, which is contrary to the country’s high ranking in pre-COVID-19 preparedness rankings. The article assesses the various components of pre-COVID-19 pandemic preparedness such as pandemic strategy, exercises, and stockpiles, and it covers government decision making processes on the early response, including questions around post-travel quarantining, test and trace, and mobility restrictions. The article concludes that there were important deficiencies in the UK's pandemic preparedness and early response in the COVID-19 pandemic. These include the centrality of the ‘inevitability of spread’-assumption underpinning the UK’s pandemic planning pre-COVID, the insufficient implementation of pandemic exercise recommendations, the lack of early and ‘live learning’ from other countries’ experiences, the lack of adoption of public health advice of the World Health Organisation early on, the late implementation of internal mobility restrictions, the lack of timely consideration of alternative early pandemic response models, and fragilities in the SAGE/governmental interplay.
